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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RENNOLD PENDER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
MOSE ALIX, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents,

Case No.
9,167

vs.
LEON BROWN,
Intervening Plaintiff and Respondent

APPELLANT'S
PETITION FOR, and BRIEF ON REHEARING
Comes now the petitioner (the appellant and plaintiff in the
former proceedings herein), and moves .this HONORABLE
COURT, for a rehearing and reconsideration of its opinion
and decree heretofore entered and filed in the above entitled
cause, and for grounds and as bases for such motion, relies
upon the following:
( l) That this Honorable Court erred in its decision
and opinion in holding that the four year, or any, statute
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of limitations was applicable to the right of plaintiff-appellant to proceed against intervening plaintiff and respondent.
( 2) That this honorable Court by inadvertence and
oversight, erred in its decision, respecting the quantum of
proof of title to he required to he presented by intervening
plaintiff and respondent Brown, to establish his tax title.
( 3) That this Honorable Court by inadvertence overlooked the proper quantum of proof as to the validity
of intervening plaintiff and respondent Brown's purported
adverse holding and possession of land under the seven year
statute, and erred with respect thereto.
( 4) That this Honorable Court, by inadvertence erred
in its decision by failing to hold that there were issues of
fact requiring trial involved.
ARGUMENT:

POINTS.

The following points will be argued in support of the
motion for reconsideration and rehearing, based upon the
foregoing statement of erroneous conclusions in the majority
opinion of the court heretofore rendered in this cause:

I. - APPELLANT'S ACTION NOT BARRED BY
STATUTES OF LIMITATION.
II.- FAILURE OF PROOF OF RESPONDENT
BROWN'S TAX TITLE.
III. - INSUFFICIENCY OF PROOF OF RESPONDENT BROWN'S ADVERSE POSSESSION ..
IV. - SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOT TO SUPPLANT
TRIAL OF FACTUAL ISSUES.
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ARGUMENT PROPER
POINT I. - APPELLANT'S ACTION NOT BARRED
BY STATUTES OF LIMITATION.
The majority opinion of this Honorable Court assumes
that the alleged deed submitted by respondent Brown, as the
basis of his title from Salt Lake County, Utah (Rec. 28), is
and was a tax deed, as used in connection with the application of the wording of the various Utah statutes relating to
(a) The presumptions to be given as to the validity of tax
procedures, (b) As affecting the application of the statutes
of limitation relating to tax titles.
As very ably shown by the dissenting opinion of Chief
Justice Crockett in Pender vs. Mose Alix, et al. vs Leon
Brown, ........ Utah ........ , ........ Pac. 2nd ........ , from which the
following is quoted:
"It cannot be assumed that the plaintiff Brown
has a tax title merely because of the fact that he
received a quit-claim deed from Salt Lake County,
which has no credit except its own recitals. Absent
such an assumption, there appears not one scintilla of
evidence in the record competent to prove that Salt
Lake County ever acquired an interest in this property, from any source, for taxes, or otherwise."
it is apparent that the assumption in the majority opinion
is erroneous in that it assumes a fact not in evidence, or
proved by any competent evidence. And such assumption,
being erroneous, as to the existence of a tax title in respondent Brown, it follows then that the further determination of
the majority of the court, as set forth in the prevailing opinion
heretofore rendered in this cause:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
"Under such uncontroverted circumstances, and
applying the provisions of Title 78-12-5.2 thereto, it
becomes obvious that Pender [appellant herein] was
vulnerable to the four year limitations statute mentioned."
that such would be erroneous, because, absent any competent
proof in the record that Salt Lake County had obtained tax
title to the property in question, there could be no proper
application of the four year statute above mentioned in the
quoted excerpt, since, no situation existed where a tax title to
which said statute could apply is shown to be extant.
Also, as heretofore set out in detail in Point II (Page 6)
of Appellant's Original Brief, and in Point III (Page 7) of
Appellant's Reply Brief, and in the Conclusion of the Appellant's Reply Brief (Page ll), the filing of the original action
herein in this situation tolled the statute of limitations. For
brevity in presentation, further discussion will be omitted as
to this latter material and authorities cited therein, hut,
same IS hereby called to the attention of this Honorable
Court.
POINT II- FAILURE OF PROOF OF RESPONDENT
BROWN'S TAX TITLE.
The majority opinion of this Honorable Court, rendered
herein, fails to give consideration to the fact, that even assuming that the respondent were endeavoring to quiet his title
is an uncontested or default matter, that the quantum of proof
as to his alleged tax title adduced in this cause, would not
be sufficient to entitle him to a decree quieting his title, and
the trial court would be justified in refusing to grant him a
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decree by way of relief, since no introduction of a tax sale
record, or auditor's deed, in order to prove that there was a
tax sale, a transfer to the county or a third person, and to
prove (at least prima facie) the validity of the steps taken
of the proceedings up to the point of sale. Certainly, in cases
such as the present, where there is an actual and protesting
adverse party, certainly a less stringent rule of proof of the
elements required or necessary to prove the existence of a
tax title, and the proceedings relating thereto, should not be
sanctioned as compared with a default case!!!
Chief Justice Crockett's comments in his dissent, suecindy illustrate the injustice of assuming to be so, what the
statute requires to be proven, and, in the interests of clarity
and brevity, his pertinent comments are quoted; from the
opinion in the instant cause:
"But nothing could be plainer than that these
statutes rsections 5, 7 of Section 59-10-64 U.C.A.
19531 were not designed to permit the use of the
magic words 'tax title', and eliminate all necessity
of proving that the claimant had something that at
least resembled one. Even the most casual reading
of their language indicates that they presuppose that
before one could have their benefit, there must be
some modicum of proof that there has been a tax
delinquency and a tax sale. In other words, there
must be at least some semblance of a tax title even
though it may be iregular and invalid. But they
cannot be applicable where there is a total absence of
proof any tax title as is the case here."
Under these circumstances, can it be that the majority
opinion was meant to sanction in quiet title actions a lesser
quantum of proof than is required by the statutory minimals?
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If so, are the statutes then overturned? Is it no longer necessary to bottom the proof of a tax title upon something 'showing both the existence and validity of the tax proceedings, at
least when certain instruments are by statute made prima
facie evidence of the existence and validity of divestiture
proceedings? It is believed, that viewed in this light, the
apparent sanction of the majority opinion as to the quantum
of proof required, being reduced below the statutory standards heretofore existing, is without precedent, and constitutes
oversight resulting in error which should be corrected.
POINT III - INSUFFICIENNCY OF PROOF OF
RESPONDENT BROWN'S ADVERSE POSSESSION.
The respondent Brown's further contention that his
alleged deed from Salt Lake County considered as color of
title, plus adverse possession and payment of taxes, creates in
him a new title, seems to have been allowed without further
discusion on the part of the majority of the court, and, by
this action, it would appear that summary judgment has
likewise been applied to give respondent Brown the benefit
of his contentions.
Here again, however, a careful examination of the
facts and law, would indicate an oversight, or omission, on
the part of the majority of the Court, resulting in compounding eror, for, if, as heretofore demonstrated, no competent
proof of tax title is presented by the respondent Brown, and
no application of the short four year statute of limitations is
warranted, then respondent Brown's reliance upon the seven
year statute requiring adverse possession and usage in addition to the payment of taxes, is likewise insufficient for two
reasons:
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( 1) No adequate showing aside from the respondent
Brown's own-self-serving declarations, as to the sufficiency
of the nature of adverse possession is made, and,
( 2) Such adverse use purportedly made, is, m fact
denied, as evidenced by the introduction of affidavits of
neighbors controverting such adverse use for the period
requisite to show adverse possession.
(See Appellant's
Original Brief, Point III, Page 9).
And, quite understandably, the Honorable Chief Justice
in his dissenting opinion rendered herein, could not likewise
countenance the lack of substantiating evidence to support a
claim of adverse possession and usage for seven years, as
he indicated in his dissenting opinion heretofore filed in
this case:
"Inasmuch as the case is being disposed of upon
summary judgment, the issue of possession is not
reached. Yet I deem it not amiss to make this observation: On that issue the defendant relies solely
upon his own affidavit, which the fact trier may or
may not believe because of his obvious self interest
[Citing Pages vs Fed. Sec. Ins. Co., 8 Utah 2nd 226,
332 P. 2nd 6661- He never has been subject to cross
examination on the self serving statements therein. In
dispute thereof are affidavits of two disinterested witnesses who were present in the neighborhood during
the years in question, concerning lack of possession
and occupancy of the property
Yet their statements are sufficient to cast grave doubt
upon the claim of the plaintiff [respondent l Brown."
Certainly, in view of the foregoing it would seem
improbable that the issue of adverse possession in a contro-
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verted matter should be thus settled by summary judgment,
and, yet, the net effect of the majority opinion is to do this!!!
POINT IV- SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOT TO
SUPPLANT TRIAL OF FACTUAL ISSUES.
Lastly, the holding of this Honorable Court, in upholding the summary judgment of the trial as rendered herein,
is in effect denying the appellant the right to have this con·
troverted issue of adverse possession determined as a factual
matter. And, as set out in Point IV of Appellant's Original
Brief (Page 11) such factual matters when in dispute,
negate the disposition of the matter by summary judgment.
The Honorable Chief Justice, in his dissenting opinion, in
this case, recognized this shortcoming in the majority opinion,
when it was pointed out:
"It should be kept in mind that this is a review
of a summary judgment, that it is a drastic remedy
which deprivves the party of the opportunity to pre·
sent his evidence, and which the courts should be
extremely reluctant to grant. When it does so, the
record must be reviewed in the light most favorable to
the defeated party, and wherever the claims of the
parties are in dispute, it must be assumed that his
claim will be believed. This is so, because he should
be turned out of court without trial only when, in
viewing the record as above stated, and all doubts are
resolved in his favor, he nevertheless would not be
entitled to prevail (citing Young vs. Texas Company,
8 Utah 2nd 206, 331 Pac 2nd 1099).
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C 0 N C L US I 0 N.
Upon these facts, and under these circumstances, It Is
urged that this Honorable Court reconsider its former majority opinion herein rendered, in the light of the foregoing,
and of the consequences and inferences which may flow
from the decision as it now stands, and, that in connection
with such reconsideration, that the original majority opinion
herein be recalled or modified in accordance with the foregoing arguments, and, that as sought in appellant's original
brief, that a reversal of the summary judgment heretofore
rendered by the trial court in this cause be granted, and the
cause remanded to the district court, if for no other reason
than that the respondent Brown has utterly failed to sustain
the burden of his proof as to the existence of any tax title,
or, as to his adverse possession acts, so as to warrant quieting his title.
Respectfully Submitted,
R. S. JOHNSON
207 Atlas Building
Salt Lake City l, Utah
Attorney for plaintiff and
appellant, Rennold Pender.
Receipt of three (3) copies of the foregoing "Appellant's
Petition for, and Brief on Rehearing", is acknowledged this
27th day of September, 1960.

Attorneys for Respondent, Leon Brown.
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